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extent that it abates the plaintiff's demand. 7 However, unlike prior
expressions of the equitable recoupment doctrine in New York,8
the CPLR does not require the counterclaim or defense to be based
on the same theory as the complaint. 9 Instead, the defense or
counterclaim need only stem from the "transactions, occurrences,
or series of transactions or occurrences . . ." out of which the
complaint arises. 10 Thus, where a claim in a complaint is based
on contract, a counterclaim in tort arising from the same transactions, as in the Chevron case, should be allowed to be interposed
to the extent that it abates a plaintiff's claim, regardless of the fact
that it would be barred as an independent cause of action by the
statute of limitations.
CPLR 205(a):

Prior dismissal for failure to serve timely complaint not a bar to extension.

CPLR 205(a), a saving statute, allows a plaintiff to commence
a new action on the same cause within six months after the cessation of the original action even though the statute of limitations
would have since run,:" provided the original action is not terminated, 12 inter alia, by a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute.'" One issue which has repeatedly confronted the courts both
under the CPA and the CPLR is whether a dismissal for failure
to serve a timely complaint' 4 constitutes a dismissal for failure to
prosecute. 15
In the recent case of Virgilio v. Ketchum,"0 the court was
faced with the issue of whether plaintiffs should be allowed to
commence, for a second time, two actions after they were dismissed
initially pursuant to CPLR 3012(b), without prejudice, for failure
to serve timely complaints. The causes of action arose on November 6, 1966 and were dismissed on April 24, 1967. The new
7
See Tite Guar. & Trust Co. v. Hicks, 283 App. Div. 723, 127
N.Y.S.2d 340 (2d Dep't 1954).
8 See Fish v. Conley, 221 App. Div. 609, 225 N.Y.S. 27 (3d Dep't

1927).9

For a complete discussion of the equitable recoupment doctrine under
the CPLR, see generally 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL
PRACTICE
203.25 (1963).
10 CPLR 203(c).
:"This section is based upon CPA § 23; the only change is a reduction
of the saving period from one year to six months.
12 The word terminated includes a judgment reversed on appeal without
awarding a new trial. SECOND REP. 52.
'3 Additionally, CPLR 205 is inapplicable where the action is terminated
by a voluntary discontinuance or a final judgment on the merits. CPLR

205 (a).
14

See CPLR 3012(b).

'5 See CPLR 3216.

1654 Misc. 2d 111, 281 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1967).

1968]

THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

actions were instituted on May 27, 1967. The date of the service
of the summons for each initial action was not specifically determined, but they were served no later than March 27, 1967. The
supreme court, Broome County, ruled that, although the plaintiffs
should have more properly proceeded by seeking to open their
defaults under CPLR 5015,'" the delay of the plaintiffs in serving
the complaints was minor and of short duration and they could,
therefore, bring new actions under CPLR 205(a). Thus, the instant case intimates that a court will look to the particular CPLR
3012 dismissal to determine whether the plaintiff will gain the
benefit of CPLR 205.
Plaintiffs' counsel in the present case failed to note to the
court that 205 (a) bore no relevance to the facts presented. CPLR
205(a) was clearly meant to be only a saving provision. In Virgilio, the suits were for libel, which has a one year period of
limitation."' And, since at the time of decision the original statute
of limitations had not yet expired, Virgilio was not a proper case
for the invocation of CPLR 205(a). The plaintiffs, therefore,
should have been forced to open their defaults through the procedure of CPLR 5015.
CPLR 207(3): Tolling provision applicable where non-resident
motor vehicle owner's address is incorrectly given.
Under CPA § 19, the predecessor of and essentially similar to
CPLR 207, if a person were without the state when a cause of
action accrued against him, or, if a person left the state for four
months or more after such cause of action had accrued against
him, the statute of limitations would be tolled during the period
of his absence. Section 19, however, was inapplicable "[w]hile a
designation or appointment, voluntary or involuntary, made in
pursuance of law, of a resident or non-resident .

.

. private or pub-

lic officer on whom a summons may be served within the state for
another resident or non-resident person . . . with the same legal
force and validity as if served personally on such person . . . with-

in the state, remains in force." 19
The test as to whether CPA § 19 was applicable, i.e., whether
the statute of limitations continued to run regardless of the defendant's absence, was whether the defendant was amenable to
17
See Salinger v. Hollander, 19 App. Div. 2d 559, 241 N.Y.S.2d 43
(2d Dep't 1963).
18 CPLR 215(3).
19
CPA § 19(1).

